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RECENT CASES
is evidentiary in origin. Yet, the right to confront opposing witnesses is
affirmed as a fundamental right. The result is that a fundamental right is
impaired by a state evidentiary rule. On these grounds, the decision in the
instant case is untenable, for the degree of justice a man receives should
not be constrained by a state rule which facilitates conviction. The plu-
rality never adequately explained the basis of the decision, and failing
this, turned to the "harmless error" doctrine. Their dismissal of the evi-
dence on this ground appears to have been proved patently at variance
with the Kotteakos test54 in Justice Marshall's dissent. It is difficult not to
have doubts that the evidence may well have swayed the jury, especially
in light of the trial judge's charge.55 Regardless of the weight of the other
evidence, Douglas' recognition that an accomplice's statements are usually
highly prejudicial and potentially very damaging lends credence to the
suggestion that Shaw's testimony could well have influenced the jury in
reaching its verdict. In this case, the federal rule, both in terms of justice
and logic is the sounder, for it places a limit on the time when a defendant
can be bound and put in jeopardy by an accomplice's admissions. This
point has been declared to be when the conspiracy has ended, that is, when
the last overt act has been consummated. The conspiracy has been defini-
tively declared at an end by prior Supreme Court decisions when the con-
spirators are in custody. The rejection by the Court of imputed conspiracy
in Krulewitch and the warnings contained in that decision against expand-
ing the doctrine of conspiracy stand as sound judicial policy which casts
the decision in the instant case as anomolous. The decision neither answers
the essential questions, nor does it serve to clarify existing law in this area.
Rather, it has all the earmarks of a Pandora's box waiting to be opened.
NORMAN A. LEBLANC, JR.
FAMILY LAW-STATUTE PROVIDING FOR MATCHING RELIGIONS OF CHILD
AND ADoPTIvE PARENTS WHEN PRACTICABLE DEEMED INAPPLICABLE WHERE
IT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY DELAY PLACING CHILD
In this civil proceeding against a mother for neglect of her out-of-
wedlock child, the Family Court of New York City was presented with
two issues; namely, whether the mother's consent was necessary for an adop-
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. The charge to the jury in pertinent part reads: "Slight evidence from an
extraneous source identifying the accused as a participator in the criminal act will be
sufficient corroboration of an accomplice to support a verdict". Evans v. State, 222 Ga.
392, 394, 150 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1966) (emphasis added).
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don of the child under Domestic Relations Law section 111,1 and whether
section 116 of the New York Family Court Act2 prohibited placement with
persons of a different religious faith than that of the child, or with a duly
authorized agency controlled by persons of a different faith. At the time
of the action, the putative father was serving a prison sentence on nar-
cotics charges. The mother, an admitted narcotics addict who had repeat-
edly refused treatment, had served sporadic jail sentences during the last
two years on charges of prostitution, theft, and possession of narcotics.
She was either unable or unwilling to testify as to the child's whereabouts
during these periods. The court found that the child, who had not yet
attained the age of three, had been left with various unrelated men and
women of questionable character. The mother, although she opposed the
adoption, did not wish to retain custody of the child for herself, but rather,
wanted custody awarded to one Miss C., whom the court found to be
"flagrantly unsuitable." The natural mother had been baptized as a Ro-
man Catholic, but the child had not. Prior to the commencement of this
action, a reputable nonsectarian agency had already conducted research
on this child's case and had found a couple seeking to adopt a Puerto
Rican baby. The prospective father was Protestant and his wife embraced
the Jewish faith. Concurrently, a Catholic agency which had explored the
chances of the child's adoption by a Catholic couple, had, after five weeks
of investigation, reported its inability -to assure placement. Held, the
mother's consent to the adoption is not required pursuant to Domestic
Relations Law section 1113 and the "when practicable" clause of section
1. N.Y. Dom. REL.. LAW § 111 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides that only the
natural mother's consent is required for the adoption of her out-of-wedlock child.
2. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 116 (McKinney 1963) in pertinent part provides:
Section 116. Religion of custodial persons and agencies
(a) Whenever a child is remanded or committed by the court to any
duly authorized association, agency, society or institution, other
than an institution supported and controlled by the state or a
subdivision thereof, such commitment must be made, when prac-
ticable, to a duly authorized association, agency, society or institu-
tion under control of persons of the same religious faith or persua-
sion as that of the child (emphasis added).
(c) In appointing guardians of children except guardians ad litem, and
in granting orders of adoption of children, the court must, when
practicable, appoint only as such guardians, and only give custody
through adoption to, persons of the same religious faith or persua-
sion as that of the child (emphasis added).
3. As to the question of consent, the law in New York has been settled both by
statute and case law. New York's Domestic Relations Law Section 111 provides that:
The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned the child
or . . . who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account
of cruelty or neglect, or pursuant to a judicial finding that the child is a per-
manently neglected child . . . (emphasis added).
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116 of the Family Court Act concerning similar religious affiliation is in-
operative when its application would substantially delay the child's adop-
tion. In re Efrain C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 814 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Fain. Ct. 1970) .4
Of import in the instant case is the resolution of the religious match-
ing question, and here, particular attention must be drawn to the use of
the term "when practicable" in Family Court Act section 116. Generally
speaking, the statute provides that "when practicable," the court must
place a child with either an adoptive agency controlled by persons of the
same faitht or with adoptive parents of the same faith.6 The legislative
intent is to insure that the child's faith is preserved and protected.7 The
statute additionally provides that a determination as to the applicability
of the "when practicable" provision will be unnecessary:
]f there is a proper or suitable person of the same religious
aith or persuasion as that of the child available for appointment
as guardian, or to be designated as custodian, or to whom control
may be given, or to whom orders of adoption may be granted; or
if there is a duly authorized association, agency, society or insti-
tution under the control of persons of the same religious faith or
persuasion as that of the child, at the time available and willing
to assume the responsibility for the custody of or control over
any such child.8
This statutory language permits an interpretation that if an agency coil-
trolled by the same religious faith is available, it should be favored over
an adoptive couple who, though eligible and willing to adopt the child,
are of a different religious persuasion.
Judicial interpretation of the "when practicable" clause is rather mea-
ger. In re Anonymous9 involved a mother who had allegedly signed a con-
Accord, In re Adoption of Favro, 44 Misc. 2d 464, 254 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Fain. Ct. 1964);
In re Anonymous, 23 Misc. 2d 577, 197 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re Adoption
of Nuttall, 24 Misc. 2d 588, 208 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sur. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 12 App. Div.
2d 729, 215 N.Y.S.2d 221 (4th Dep't 1969); People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous,
19 Misc. 2d 441, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Adoption of Anonymous, 10 Misc.
2d 1076, 170 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958); In re Marino's Adoption, 168 Misc. 158.
5 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
4. Hereinafter referred to as instant case.
5. N.Y. FAmLy CT. Acr § 116 (a) (McKinney 1963).
6. Id. § 116(c).
7. Id. § 116 (d). This section in pertinent part provides:
(d) The provisions of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of 'this section shall
be interpreted literally, so as to assure that in the care, protection,
guardianship, discipline or control of any child his religious faith
shall be preserved and protected by the court.
8. Id. § 116 (e) (emphasis added).
9. 195 Misc. 6, 88 N.YS.2d 829 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
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sent for adoption of her illegitimate child which she later repudiated. The
court upheld her repudiation on the grounds that it was obtained through
misrepresentation, misunderstanding and fraud. Although the petitioners
for adoption were of a different religious faith than the natural mother
or child, the court had established adequate grounds for refusing the adop-
tion, and they never reached the question of how to interpret "when
practicable,"'1 but merely reaffirmed the requirement of religious match-
ing, implying that it was mandatory.
The first case to actually grapple with an interpretation of the "when
practicable" clause was In re Santos.l1 A mother had left her two children
to be boarded with a Jewish woman to whom she paid money for their
care. When the mother was unable to pay any longer, she requested the
woman to either care for them herself, or place the children in a Catholic
home, as they had been baptized Catholic. Instead, the woman instructed
the children in the Jewish faith, and eventually placed the children in the
custody of a Jewish agency. When the mother discovered this fact, she
brought an action seeking custody. The trial court, after finding abandon-
ment, awarded custody to the Jewish agency, even though the children's
Catholic baptism had been revealed. The Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment,12 reversed and held that upon a finding of the mother's unfitness,
the children should have been given over to a Catholic agency. The court
further held that the "when practicable" provision was mandatory, leaving
no room for judicial discretion. The court concluded that as to the pres-
ervation and protection of the religious faith of the children they "...
have a natural and legal right of which they cannot be deprived by their
temporary exposure to the culture of another religion prior to the age of
10. The "when practicable" provision here dealt with was as found in the New
York Social Welfare Law section 373 which provides:
Section 373. Religious faith
(1) Whenever a child is committed to any agency, association, corpora-
tion institution or society, other than an institution supported
and controlled by the state or a subdivision thereof, such commit-
ment shall be made, when practicable, to an authorized agency
under the control of persons of the same religious faith as that of
the child (emphasis added).
(3) In appointing guardians of children, and in granting orders of
adoption of children, the court shall, when practicable, appoint as
such guardians, and give custody through adoption, only to a per-
son or persons of the same religious faith as the child (emphasis
added).
11. 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 279 App. Div. 578, 107 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Ist Dep't 1951), appeal dismissed, 304
N.Y. 483, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952).
12. 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1951).
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reason."' 3 Of course, the possibility that the children, "prior to the age
of reason," might not yet have developed a sence of awareness as to the
recondite aspects of religion seems not to have been considered by the
court at all.
Santos stood as law until the decision in In re Maxwell.14 In Maxwell,
the mother had six children prior to her marital separation in 1950. All
but one of these children had been taken away from her by the Canadian
authorities and placed either with private families or institutions. The
mother then became pregnant and, fearing that she would lose custody of
the remaining child, attempted to conceal this pregnancy. She came to
Buffalo, New York, to give birth, informed her doctor that she did not
want the baby, and requested him to find a home for the child. The couple
found by the doctor was Protestant, and their attorney approached the
plaintiff-mother with a consent form, which she signed stating that at the
time she embraced no religious faith. She later repudiated her consent,
alleging that she had not known the contents of the document she had
signed, that she was Catholic and that she wanted the child raised in -that
faith. The trial court found15 she had abandoned the child and willfully
consented to its adoption and, therefore, awarded custody to the respon-
dants on condition that the baby be baptized and educated in the Catholic
faith. The New York Court of Appeals,16 in affirming, found that it was
not the consent form that she had signed, but her "callous disregard for
the child, her complete indifference to how he was faring"'17 that author-
ized a waiver of her consent. The opinion went on to say that the religious-
matching provisions do "not require a court to deny custody to adoptive
parents where a child has been accepted by them following a declaration
or representation by the mother, which may or may not be true, that she
does not embrace any religious faith."' 8 The court concluded:
The statute calls upon the court to give custody to persons of the
same religious faith as that of the child 'when practicable.' That
term is of broad content, necessarily designed to accord the trial
judge a discretion to approve as adoptive parents persons of a
faith different from the child's in exceptional situations .... The
presence in the statute of the words 'when practicable' was to
enable the court to relax the requirement in the unusual case
such as the one before us.19
13. Id. at 375, 105 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
14. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.YS.2d 281 (1958).
15. 4 App. Div. 2d 1005, 168 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1957), affd sub nom. In re Maxwell, 4
N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
16. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
17. Id. at 433, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
18. Id. at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
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The principle established by Maxwell is that if the matching of the child's
and adoptive parents' religion will be detrimental to the child's temporal
welfare, it cannot be deemed "practicable."
Judge Desmond, in his dissent,20 reiterated the principles of Santos.
He was of the opinion that the false statement was irrelevant since the
court had a duty to rectify the mistake once the truth concerning the
child's religion was revealed. He emphasized that only age2 ' and religious
affiliation had been singled out for special consideration by the legislature
evincing an intent on their part to accord these factors special significance.
He also expressed disbelief that there were no eligible Catholic couples
who could be found in Buffalo to preclude the placing of this child with
a Catholic agency. (It would seem, however, that the question does not
revolve around the availability of eligible Catholic couples, but rather,
whether they would be willing to adopt this particular child, a point which
Judge Desmond seems to ignore).
It should be pointed out that there are important distinctions between
Santos and Maxwell. In the former, the religion of the children was de-
termined to be Catholic not only on the grounds that Catholicism was the
declared faith of the mother, but also because the children had been so
baptized. In Maxwell, however, the mother first expressed that she em-
braced no faith, and only after approximately a year had passed, did she
concern herself with the child, and then make a representation of being a
Catholic. In Santos, the decision resulted in the relocation of the children
with a Catholic agency, although their entire religious training had been
in Judaism. Maxwell, on the other hand, allowed the adoption over the
mother's objection, only after the adoptive parents agreed to baptize and
educate the child as Catholic. Thus, the court respected the wishes of the
natural mother, but at the expense of a cross-religious adoption. What
the result would have been had the adoptive parents in Maxwell not
agreed to raise the child as Catholic is conjectural. Of certainty is the
overruling of the iron rule of mandatory interpretation announced in
Santos.
A number of states have statutes similar or identical to New York's
Family Court Act section 116.22 Likewise, there have arisen varying in-
20. Id. at 435, 151 N.E.2d at 851, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
21. New York's Domestic Relations Law section 110 in pertinent part provides:
Section 110. Who may adopt; effect of article
An adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult wife
together may adopt another person. An adult or minor husband and
his adult or minor wife together may adopt a child of either of them
born in or out of wedlock and an adult or minor husband or an adult
or minor wife may adopt such a child of the other spouse.
22. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2423 (1951); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 210 § 5B (1958);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.221 (1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-13 (1956).
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terpretations of the religious matching provision by the courts of these
states. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, interpreting that state's religious
matching provision in -the case of Eggleston v. Landrum,23 awarded custody
of minor children to a couple who belonged to the Christian Science
Church, over the objection of the children's grandmother that the beliefs
of said Church prohibit the use of medical care, and thus, would jeopardize
the children's welfare. The adoptive parents had had custody for quite
some time and, throughout this period, had at all times obtained for the
children necessary medical treatment. The court concluded that the re-
ligious matching requirement was but one of many factors to be considered,
the temporal welfare of the children having the greatest weight. Since the
facts showed that the children had not been denied medical care at any
time by the adoptive parents because of their religious faith, the court
awarded the adoption over the petitioner's objections. Cooper v. Hin-
richs,2 4 an Illinois decision, involved the adoption of twin children born
five months after their natural parents were divorced. Both parents con-
sented to the adoption, but the mother later repudiated on the grounds
that the adoptive parents were Presbyterians and planned to raise the chil-
dren as such, whereas they had been baptized Roman Catholic; thus, she
argued that to allow the adoption would violate the matching requirement
of the Illinois statute. The petitioners were found to be well-qualified as
adoptive parents, while charges were brought against -the natural mother
for unfitness, adultery and habitual drunkenness. The Illinois statute
used the terms "shall" rather than "must," and "when possible" rather
)than "when practicable," and the court interpreted this as evincing a legis-
lative intent to allow judicial discretion when religion is one of the factors.
They also stated that the primary consideration was the temporal welfare
of the child. The cause was reversed and remanded to the lower court to
determine whether the adoption would be in the best interests of the chil-
dren, with religion an important, but not exclusive, consideration. 5
Massachusetts, on the other hand, has opted for the mandatory in-
terpretation. In re Goldman26 involved a statute identical to New York's
which also provided for religious matching of children and adoptive par-
ents "when practicable." There, the petitioners were Jewish, having cus-
tody of twins whose natural parents were both Catholic. Since the children
23. 210 Miss. 665, 50 So. 2d 364 (1951).
24. 110 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
25. See also In re McKenzie, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936); State ex rel.
Evangelical Lutheran Kinderfreund Soc. of Minnesota v. White, 123 Minn. 508, 144
N.W. 157 (1913); In re Duren, 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947); State ex rel.
Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913); In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479,
109 A. 683 (1920).
26. 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
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were born out-of-wedlock, the court first imputed the mother's religion to
the children. Secondly, the court found there were many eligible Catholic
couples who were seeking to adopt children. The court, interpreting "when
practicable" as leaving no room for judicial discretion, awarded the chil-
dren to a Catholic agency, to go to a Catholic couple. The opinion also
stressed the fact that the petitioners had dark complexions and dark eyes,
while the twins had blue eyes and flaxen hair, thus bringing another factor,
physical features, into the decision. Therefore, Goldman may be looked
at as not only involving the religious consideration, but also the feeling
that the parents and children should at least resemble one another.
The decision in the instant case follows Maxwell in its declaration
that the temporal welfare of the child is the primary consideration. How-
ever, the term "when practicable" is given a concreteness never before
known. Maxwell stood for the principle that if religious matching proves
detrimental to the child's psychic and emotional welfare, it cannot be
deemed "practicable." The instant case extends this to equate "when prac-
ticable" with "no substantial delay," and then defines "substantial delay"
as longer than one or two months. To read section 116 (e) any other way,
reasons the court, would render it unconstitutional as a violation of the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection 7 as it incorporates
the first amendment prohibitions on government interference with or sup-
port of religion.28 The court does recognize the right of the parent to de-
termine his child's religious upbringing, but limits this severely by the
superior claim of the child to temporal happiness:
In relation to adoption, the biological parent's constitutional
rights would seem to entitle him at most to express his religious
or nonreligious preference as a condition of his surrender of his
child for adoption. Other than this limited parental right, there
appears to be no ground, consistent with the Constitution, for
attributing a religious preference to an adoptive child who is be-
low the age for actual religious training. Certainly it would be
unconstitutional to stamp an adoptive child with his progenitor's
religion on the basis of any theological doctrine of a congenital
transmission of faith. . . . Adoption being a creature of State
power and secular law, it would violate -the constitutional prin-
27. US. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. ...
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ciple of State neutrality on religion for the State in its adoptive
practices to promote Church interests, or to force a religious iden-
tification upon a child.2 9
Thus, the natural parent's religious preference must yield to the child's
temporal welfare, for "the State cannot constitutionally enforce the par-
ental religious preferences at the expense of the welfare of the child."30
The result is a cross-religious adoption absent any restrictions.
Santos did more than make religious matching mandatory. It made
it an absolute, and like all absolutes, it proved impossible to live with.
Maxwell, while emphasizing the child's welfare, gave the natural mother's
religious wishes undeserved weight. The result was a cross-religious adoption,
but with qualifications that were unnecessarily restrictive. The decision
in the instant case is the one which should have been reached in Maxwell.
In re Efrain C. puts the question of religion into proper perspective. It
does not ignore the religious consideration, but merely asserts that it is
one factor to be considered. It is not, however, to be given the position of
primacy to which it had been previously elevated. Such a result seems to
be the soundest and most logical. In the first place, imputing the parent's
religion to a child by the courts is only a nominal act. To say, for example,
that a child is Roman Catholic because his parents are is to declare this
child's religion in name only. Unless the child is baptized, he will never
be recognized by that faith as a bona fide member, nor will he be entitled
to the benefits of that religion. Usually, this will not prove to be a prob-
lem, because the natural parents will provide a suitable home life, and
will undertake -to instruct their children on religion as they see fit, which
is their constitutionally guaranteed right.3 1 Second, imputing a religion
to a child prior to the age at which he can understand theological doc-
trines does not bestow upon him any understanding of religion. Finally,
in the case of a mother who has been judicially deprived of her consent
because of her neglect or abandonment of the child, to allow her to exer-
cise such control over the child seems absurd. There is much more to
being a parent than giving birth. When a natural mother does not show
the least inclination to care for her offspring, how can it be persuasively
argued that she should have any rights concerning the child? As the court
in Efrain points out, the most she should be entitled to is an expression
of preference concerning the religion of the child. The importance of
Efrain is that it causes Maxwell, and the law of New York, to come of age.
When an attempt to match religions substantially delays the placing of
29. In re Efrain C., 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 1027-28, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255, 264-65 (Fain. Ct.
1970).
30. 63 Misc. 2d at 1028, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
31. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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the child with adoptive parents, it will be deemed as "not practicable."
Unlike Maxwell, however, the adoptive parents will receive custody of the
child without any restrictions or qualifications. Thus, the child's religious
training will be determined by his adoptive parents, the same parents who
will be responsible for his education, health, safety, indeed, his entire
temporal welfare. To allow the natural mother whose affections will never
be known by the child to thwart his chance at temporal welfare is inexcus-
able. One might question whether one or two months is a reasonable limit
on "When practicable," but undoubtedly the New York Family Court has
taken a progressive step in a most critical area.
NORMAN A. LE BLANC, JR.
